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Epistemic possibility operates with may and interchangeably with might that introduce a direct-
unobservable effect in a modalized causal relation that reveals a semantic cause-and-effect compatibility. It also
operates with could to introduce a direct-unobservable cause without any authoritative evidential, may to introduce
a cause derived from an authoritative (indirect-unobservable) assumption through an informal fallacy. The
presence of the possibility level is reinforced by other operators. The operator possible is used to introduce a
direct-unobservable cause without any help of an authoritative evidential, a direct-unobservable cause derived
from an authoritative assumption through an informal fallacy, a causal relation between direct-observable
evidentials as commentary on an authoritative theory after factive causality. The operator seem also introduces
direct-unobservable cause, but also falsifies a prima facie perception. In addition to the epistemic uses, the same
operators also indicate factivity, i.e., factive may, factive might, factive possibility, neutral-factive could.  Finally,
there are cases of a simultaneous use of possibility operators. Throughout the analysis of the data, epistemic
possibility is characterized with non-factivity and optionality, i.e., proposing a non-factive option or an array of
options. It may also be identified as presenting criticism of an assumption, criticism of the data, criticism of the
ongoing learning situation, threat, and appreciation of the data. Criticism may be very salient when it is followed
by a relevant suggestion.
Keywords: possibility, epistemicity
Introduction
Language is used for a wide variety of functions, e.g., to present information, to express attitudes or to
call for some kind of action, and simple unmodified declaratives are inadequate for those subtle and significant
functions. People qualify their commitment to assertions, soften and hedge their judgments and orders, boost and
strengthen the expression of their feelings and opinions in a variety of ways. They use linguistic devices to express
their attitudes to the content of their assertions, and to reflect their perception of their relationship to the readers
(Holmes 1982: 9). Among these devices are modality markers such as modal auxiliary may, perimodal certainly,
probable and verbs of perception seem.
Quirk et al. (1985: 219-239) distinguish intrinsic (deontic) from extrinsic (epistemic) modality. Intrinsic
modality reflects human control over events and includes permission, obligation and volition. Extrinsic modality
reflects human judgment of what is or is not likely to happen and covers possibility, necessity and prediction. In
addition, Perkins (1983: 6-12) argues that modality is concerned with attitudes towards events and propositions;
the former are based on laws of society and the latter on laws of reason. The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is
similar with Ney’s (1980: 38) root-epistemic distinction, Halliday’s (1976: 204; 1985: 337) idea of modulation
and modality, and Huddlestone’s (1988) deontic-epistemic distinction. It may be epistemic, i.e., qualifying
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commitment to the truth of a proposition, or deontic, i.e., expressing obligation (Lyons, 1977: 750; Palmer, 1976:
42; Givon, 1993: 169).
Epistemic modality, reflecting attitudes towards the truth of propositions, is modality in Halliday’s
functional grammar, a stand between the positive polarity (definite yes) and the negative polarity (definite no). It
is an important feature of language and a privileged area in text analysis (Fowler, 1986: 132). It offers a choice to
a writer when he formulates a claim: to be totally or less than totally committed to the truth of his claim (Simpson,
1993: 47). An assertion such as It’s raining expresses the writer’s proposition and at the same time his commitment
to the truth of that proposition, i.e., the writer knows the truth of his own proposition. For this reason, he will not
make an assertion such as It’s raining but I don’t believe it, where the second part contradicts the assertion in the
first. On certain occasions, however, the writer may make an assertion such as It may be raining.  This assertion
shows that he is not committed wholeheartedly to the truth of the proposition. He modalizes the commitment to
some degree by expressing a judgment or assessment of the truth.
This study was intended to describe how the medial level of epistemic modality in expressed in the
discussion sections of research reports.
Review
Modality
Modality is an expression of commitment or attitudes towards an event or a proposition and assumed to
have three levels (high, median, and low). They are especially reflected on modal auxiliaries. An approach to
modality is the interpersonal approach to language use that is characterized by the compositional process of
discourse, i.e., the interpersonal function of language. Modality (Halliday 1976: 198) is concerned with
the establishment of social relations and with the participation of the individual in all kinds of personal
interaction. Language, in this function, mediates in all the various role relationships contracted by the
individual, and this plays an important part in the development of his personality.
Within this function, modality is related to “speaker’s comment” that indicates the position taken by the
speaker. Modality is seen as the “social role” component of language. Lee (1992: 136), however, uses the term
speaker intrusion to refer to speakers’ comment and modality to refer to the very wide range of meanings that are
involved in this process. Modal expressions comment on the content of an utterance. As comments, modal
expressions are non-propositional in that they lie outside the major information carrying components of the
utterance. Modality, however, is the realization of the ways in which speakers convey attitudes to and judgments
on the nature of the propositions they utter.
In written language, this approach views modality as a component in the interpersonal metafunction of
text, i.e., the interaction between the writer of the text and its intended audience, which carries a heavy semantic
load, is important in the realization of role relationships between addresser and addressee. Mood selection is
pertinent to the question of involvement and detachment (Hassan 1985: 41). In the medical case history texts, for
example, there are two relationships: that negotiated between writer and reader, and embedded within it, the
relationship between specialist and patient.
Several definitions reflect the interpersonal approach to modality. Simpson (1993: 47) defines modality
in the following way:
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Modality refers broadly to speakers’ attitude towards, or opinion about, the truth of a proposition expressed
by a sentence. It also extends to their attitude towards the situation or event described by a sentence.
This definition mentions speakers’ attitude to refer to speakers’ comment and two objects to which the
attitude is directed: the truth of a proposition and a situation or an event. These two objects of attitude correspond
to the two major types of modality: epistemic and deontic modality respectively.  Fowler (1982: 216) gives a
similar definition of modality. He refers to modality as
the means by which people express their degree of commitment to the truth of the propositions they utter,
and their views on the desirability or otherwise of the states of affairs referred to.
This definition specifies attitude as commitment and desirability and two objects of these two types of
attitude: the truth of the propositions and states of affairs. It also corresponds to the two major types of modality
as mentioned above.
The definitions above imply the functions of modality, i.e., modality enables the speaker or writer either
(1) to qualify the propositions expressed by his sentences with respect to their validity, truth, or factuality, or (2)
to indicate obligation and permission of acts performed by “morally responsible agents” (Lyons 1977: 823) with
reference to norms. These two functions also correspond to the two major types of modality. Holmes (1982: 11)
comments on the degrees of certainty concerning the validity of a proposition:
Devices used to signal different degrees of certainty concerning the validity of the information asserted
may also serve to increase or decrease the illocutionary force of speech acts: to boost or attenuate the force
of an assertion in a context of argument, for example, to soften or strengthen the force of a criticism or a
compliment.
The devices to strengthen the force are referred to as boosters, which express certainty, whereas those to
decrease the force as downtoners, which express probability and possibility. And at a more abstract level such
variations in the illocutionary force of speech acts signal degrees of solidarity and intimacy, deference and
politeness, perhaps in all societies (Brown and Levinson, 1978).
Modality Values
Modality is assumed to have values. These values refer to the degrees of strength. Foley and Valin (1985:
213-215) refer to modality as the variable of actuality of the event, whether it has been realized or not and view it
as a binary distinction between realis and irrealis poles. Between these poles is the following continuum: real -
necessary - probable - possible - unreal. The middle points in this scale are expressed in English by the modals
must, will, can and may. They also argue that modality characterizes the writer’s estimate of the relationship of
the actor of the event to its accomplishment, whether he has the obligation, the intention, or the ability to perform
it. When an actor is obliged to carry out an action, one might infer a high likelihood that the event will become a
reality, but when he is merely able to perform it, one would infer no such probability.
Another scale of modality values is proposed by Halliday (1985: 337) with three values or levels of
confidence, as given in Table 2.2. The table mentions three modality values (high, median and low) and two types
of modality, epistemic probability and deontic obligation, each of which covers three values or degrees. These
values are particularly marked by the following modals:
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Table 2.1 Modality Values
Values                                   Probability Obligation
High                                      Certain                                         Required
Median                                  Probable                                       Supposed
Low Possible                                       Allowed
the high value by must, ought to, need, has to, is to; the median value by will, would, shall, should; and the low
value by may, might, can, could. Holmes (1982: 13) also proposes the same scale of certainty: certain, probable,
possible.
Types of Modality
An assertion may be “epistemically modal,” i.e., “the speaker explicitly qualifies his commitment to the
truth of the proposition.” Simpson (1993: 50) provides the schema in Figure 2.1 about the ways in which
modalized assertions differ from categorical assertions.
Unmodalized, categorical (John is right; Mary has gone)
Strong commitment (John must be right;
Basic proposition must surely have gone)
Medium commitment (John may be right; Mary
Modalized may probably have gone)
Weak commitment (John could be right; Mary
Mary might possibly have gone)
Figure 2.1 Modalized and Categorical Propositions
On the other hand, assertions may be “categorical”, which are “straightforward statements of fact.” These
assertions are “epistemically non-modal,” i.e., the “speaker is committing himself to the truth of what he says”
(Lyons 1977: 797).
There are four modal systems of English. Deontic modality or root modality, first of all, is the modal
system of duty, as it is concerned with a speaker's attitude to the degree of obligation attaching to the performance
of certain actions. Clearly, the deontic system is of crucial relevance to the strategies of social interaction,
especially to tactics of persuasion and politeness, as also exhibited by linguistic features of persuasive discourse
in advertising language. Root modality is concerned with the speaker’s observation about whether he or others
have permission, duty or obligation to perform particular actions. Deontic modality is concerned with the necessity
or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents (Lyons 1977: 823). Most obviously this can be
related to the seeking and granting of permission and to the obligations that we impose on one another or that we
feel are imposed on us by social or moral norms; involving the issuing of directives and is associated with notions
of such as permission or obligation (Lew 1997: 146). Palmer sees deontic modality as discourse-oriented modality.
In making an epistemic judgment a speaker always draws on some kind of evidence as the warrant for
the judgment. The warrant is sometimes co-textual (literally recoverable from the preceding or following text) but
just often involves contextual assumptions (the speaker’s perceptions about the context that he may expect the
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hearer to share) or background assumptions (general or particular knowledge the speaker has and may assume is
common to him or his hearer) or any combination of these. The warrant may also involve inferences that the
speaker draws from those assumptions, and he may expect the hearer to share these too (Brown 114). Present
judgments on the likelihood of rain in the future may be expressed by It may rain or It might rain with
psychological distancing (rather than temporal). It is also possible to present judgment on the likelihood of a past
event having happened by It may/might have rained where the past time reference is achieved by have. This
sentence is non-factual. It reports judgment, in the present, about the possibility of a past event and does not tell
a fact whether it did or didn’t rain. Epistemic modality is by definition subjective. It refers to any utterance in
which “the speaker explicitly qualifies his commitment to the truth of the proposition he utters … is epistemically
modal, or modalized sentence” (Lyons 1977: 797). The speaker is the source of epistemic judgment.
The schema in Table 2.3 about modal concepts would help summarize the function of the modal systems
introduced in this section. The box enclosures are attempts to capture interrelatedness of some categories, and the
non-linguistic concepts which each category represents are explained to the right (Simpson 1993: 51).
Table 2.2 Modal Concepts
Modal System                                             Non-linguistic Concepts Represented
deontic obligation, duty, commitment
boulomaic desire
epistemic knowledge, belief, cognition
perception perception
In discussing epistemically modal assertions, Lyons (1977: 750) distinguishes between “objective
epistemic modality” and “subjective epistemic modality.” The former states an “unqualified assertion of the
possibility of a proposition”, while the latter qualifies “the assertion of the factuality of the proposition.” Lyons
(1977: 799-800) makes a further distinction between the two kinds of epistemic modality. The objective, epistemic
modality is “qualified with respect to a certain degree of probability,” i.e., the speaker is committed by the
utterance of an objectively modalized utterance to the factuality of the information that he is giving to the
addressee: he is performing an act of telling.” On the other hand, “the very essence” of subjective epistemic
modality is “to express the speaker’s reservations about giving an unqualified, or categorical ‘I-say-so’ to the
factuality of the proposition embedded in the utterance.” A subjectively modalized assertion is not an act of telling;
its “illocutionary force is similar to that of questions.” The illocutionary force of probably in ‘You probably need
to arrange the pictures in the proper order’ reveals self-questioning, a knowing strategy on the part of the speaker.
A modality analysis, therefore, provides insights into this speaker’s cognitive skills. Huddlestone (1988: 107)
introduces the informal term residue for which is left of the meaning expressed in an utterance of the clause when
the modality is abstracted away. He argues that the two most central notions in modality deal with possibility and
necessity and that there are two prototypical kinds of possibility and necessity: epistemic (pertaining to
knowledge) and deontic (binding).
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Writer-Reader Interaction
Writers of scientific discourse construct knowledge as members of a scientific community of a particular
discipline and, therefore, should obey the interactional conventions. In knowledge construction, they should obey
epistemological conventions. This section deals with the epistemological and interactional aspects of scientific
writing.
In writing, although characterized by detachment from the reading public, the writer anticipates probable
reactions and writes accordingly. This anticipation leads to the writer’s attempts to the interactional aspects of
writing such as critical judgment and politeness strategies (Renkema, 1993: 129), which may be manifested in
modality (Celce-Murcia and Larsen-Freeman, 1983: 85; Butler, 1988: 119-153; Carretero, 200: 1-12).
The anticipation of the potential readership requires scientific writing to be conducted with the highest
degree of responsibility in the language-and-knowledge relation; the responsibility to communicate ideas well, to
offer the readers honest and reasonable grounds, to adjust their beliefs and ideas to the world of available
knowledge, as Gage holds (1991: 162):
Responsible writing is that in which the writer has attempted to satisfy the unique demands of a rhetorical
situation by thinking about her own ideas, those of her audience, and the quality of the reason she might
use to bring her readers and herself into earned agreement.
This responsibility implies critical judgment, i.e., the adequacy of the support for the conclusion or measurement
of the degree of one’s convictions to match the quality of the reasons. Critical judgment orients the idea of
knowing to the scientific community, as suggested by Gage (1991: 164):
In other words, the kinds of reasons we create and the degrees to which we accept them are not conditioned
solely by rules and private understandings but are subject to the convictions, reasons, experience, and
values of those other members of the discourse community in which we interact. So that what one believes
is a result of thinking that we have done together.
The assumption is that new reasons with the potential to change the degree of conviction are always
possible. This joint venture treats reasons as qualitatively dependent on the assumption of the audience, the
language in which they are expressed. It is a process of putting one’s ideas into the context of other ideas, for the
purpose of finding out whether they are supported by adequate reasons. This process makes one realize that what
one knows is only as good as the quality of the reasons one can offer, and that this quality must be judged in terms
of the beliefs and needs of an audience that is able to assess a writer’s reasons and offer good reasons of its own.
Claims are flexible, contingent, and open to change and that a good reason is determined by communal, negotiated
acts of assent, and involving the inquiries of all participants in a scientific discourse community (Gage, 1991:
165). This is the contingent nature of argumentative discourse that is motivated by the desire to produce shared
knowledge or understanding when specific differences in knowledge or understanding exist, when there is
something to unravel, solve, resolve, and interpret (Carden, 1988: 37). Thus, the basic rhetorical situation may be
viewed as the contributions of the audience (a question at issue and assumptions) and the writer (stance and
strategy) to the communal situation (169).
Critical judgment may be realized through hedging and there has been a growing interest lately in
hedging, or modalization in Simpson’s (1990: 91) terminology. Dubois (1987) in Markkanen and Schroder (2000:
7) argues that “it has been shown that scientist can unobtrusively inject his personal views into his communication”
by using linguistic items that express uncertainty or impreciseness. Similarly, Butler (1990: 139) shows the
importance of modals in English biological and physical texts, in which they “serve the weighing of evidence,
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and more particularly in making generalizations about what is possible in the behavior of the universe, on the
basis of observation of what actually happens. This hedging is connected with the fact that scientific writing obeys
some similar mechanisms as ordinary communication does. The assumption (Markkanen and Schroder, 2000: 6)
here is that
science is not only content; that is scientific texts are not only content-oriented and informative and
informative but also aim at convincing and influencing their audience … built on pragma and on docere
(instructing, informing) but also on delectare (entertaining) and movere (moving, enchanting).
With this assumption, they add, the formulation of a scientific text should go into the subject matter
(pragma) and emphasize the reliability of the author (ethos) and also move the reader emotionally (pathos). The
last two are closely connected with the expressions in the text, including hedging; but content and form are
inseparable. Hedges are “a textual phenomenon” and a text “gets them through the author-reader interaction.
Simpson (1990: 91), supporting the view of modalization in the writer-reader interaction, holds that the
significance of modalization is in that it “directs the readers to evaluate the information”.   This is, to some extent,
controlled by culture and shared educational background (Spillner, 1974: 67).
In terms of reader-writer interaction, the writer adopts for himself the role of a producer of ideas and
assigns to the readers (fellow scientists or a scientific community) the role of receivers. The concept of role
assignment is made possible by the fact that there should be in principle in any communicative event more than
one participant and, therefore, there must be a role for each of them to play. These roles are of two kinds, social
and interactional roles. The former is dependent on the participants’ relatively static social statuses as the basis
for the prediction of the use of certain forms of language. The latter kind is, on the other hand, more dynamic
since the participants can play the different roles interchangeably. It is often the choices of certain forms of
language that the participants play their roles. This kind of role is firmly tied to the immediate interactional statuses
of the participants. Halliday (1994: 68) refers to the interactional role as “speech role”. In written discourse,
however, these roles are less obvious than that in speaking because the participants are separated from each other.
The writer and reader adopt such roles and modify their language accordingly.
There is mental negotiation in this interaction. The writer wants to be assured that it is the meaning and
the effect intended that has been created. He considers possible responses from the reader such as confirmation or
disagreement or various shades of disagreement. This consideration amounts to reshaping or modalization of
ideas. Interlocutors expect each other to provide responses to what they hear - to confirm, disagree with, or simply
signal presence or understanding. These responses need not be very long and elaborated. Such practices are called
negotiation (Martin 1992: 67). Negotiation also refers to the fact that “interpretations are jointly negotiated by
speaker and hearer and judgments either confirmed or changed by the reactions they evoke” (Gumpers 1982: 5).
It is enhanced by the inherent exchange structure of spoken discourse where “the form and content of talk is
continuously reshaped by the co-participants, through the ability to create alignments and suggest or impose
certain interpretations.” It is, of course, not possible for the reader in written discourse to ask for clarification or
indicate his understanding which will affect the on going interaction. There is, therefore, no direct negotiation.
Negotiation in written language is brought about by the writer’s need to take into account different situational
variables of the context in which his writing will be read - who is going to read it, what the reader wants to know,
etc.
Writers carefully weigh the level of their commitment depending on the epistemic status of propositions
as accredited facts or interpretations, and on the anticipated effect this commitment is likely to have on readers’
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responses (Hyland 2000: 9). The writer wants to be assured that it is the meaning and the effect intended that has
been created. He considers possible responses from the reader such as confirmation or disagreement or various
shades of disagreement. This consideration amounts to reshaping or modalization of ideas. These considerations
are an important dimension of academic discourse and a principal way that writers can use language flexibly to
adopt positions, express points of view and signal allegiances. They also represent a major contribution of the
social negotiation of knowledge and writers’ efforts to persuade readers of the correctness of their claims, helping
them to gain community acceptance for their work as a contribution to disciplinary scholarship and knowledge.
Related to weighing the evidence are hedging and mitigation. Markkanen and Schroder (1992; 2000:3)
see hedging in scientific texts as “modifiers of the writer’s responsibility for the truth value of the proposition
expressed or as modifiers of the weightiness of the information given, or the attitude of the writer to the
information”. The devices for hedging include, e.g., impersonal expressions, passivisation, and modal verbs and
adverbs. In the widened concept of hedging, the concept of epistemic modality cuts across the area of hedging. It
is defined as qualification of commitment to the truth of the proposition expressed (Lyons, 1977: 797). Coates
(1983: 49) sees epistemic modality as part of hedging. Mitigation refers to “an intentional softening or easing of
the force of the message”, a modulation of the basic message intended by the speaker (Fraser, 1975: 14). It is
modification only of effects that are unwelcome to the hearer, e.g., the force of a criticism, not of praise (though
possible in principle). Mitigation involves a reduction in the unwelcome effect of what is done, while politeness
involves a judgment whether the” what” and the “why” the speaker has done something is appropriate.
Another related phenomenon is politeness, which may be viewed as a strategy to maintain the writer-
reader co-operation on the basis of (1) negative face (freedom of action and freedom from imposition), and (2)
positive face (desire for appreciation and approval) (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61) or to be unimpeded and to be
approved Meier (1996: 346). Politeness, a state that one expects to exist in every interaction, is defined by Fraser
(1978: 10) as “a property associated with an utterance in which, in the hearer’s opinion, the speaker has neither




In general, the approach of this study is qualitative, aiming at in-depth understanding of the features of
epistemic modality. These features are the evidentials that serve as the ground for epistemic possibility and the
intentions that motivate epistemic possibility.
The data were notional units of evidentials and epistemically modalized statements. The evidential unit,
which was presented in any level of linguistic units (phrases, clauses, sentences) in the sources, was any linguistic
unit intended to be a reason, a ground, or a support for the source makers’ epistemically modalized statements.
The data of epistemically modalized statements were sentential units with the epistemic operators as described in
3.4 about data collection.  They were collected from the discussion sections of research reports.
The discussion section of a research report is the central part in scientific writing (Tuckman, 1975: 350;
McMillan, 1992).   The sources of the data are the finding-and-discussion sections of dissertations. The selection
of dissertations to be the sources of the data was based two criteria. First, they meet the requirement of scientific
rigor in that they were prepared through a scientific method in analyzing the issues through reviewing the relevant
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theories, data collection and analysis, and interpretation of the findings to enter the universal body of knowledge.
This scientific rigor was tested through the seminar classes, the proposal seminar, and the preparatory and final
exam. It was reinforced by continuing consultation to the qualified advisors. Second, they fulfill the requirement
of resourcefulness. They provided the data of evidentiality and epistemic modality in different types. They also
provided the evidence to the efforts in distinguishing epistemic modality from other types of modality, and,
therefore, contribute to the validity of the epistemic data. These detailed sections ensured in-depth understanding
through the cyclical search for recurrence of evidentials, epistemic operators, and different shades of meanings.
Third, they were written by Indonesian graduates of highest educational level (S-3 program), who are lecturers of
English at the university level and whose English competence could be considered to have reached the advanced
level. These writers are the graduates of the department of English Language Teaching at the State University of
Malang (UM).
The findings-and-discussion sections to serve as the sources of the data were taken from the accessible
dissertations of different academic years. They were finished at 1997 (1 copy), 1998 (1 copy), 1999 (1 copy),
2001 (two copies), 2003 (2 copies), and 2004 (2 copies). There were nine copies, but, for the sake of brevity, one
source is appended. The other sources are bound separately.
Data interpretation
The data were interpreted in the following ways. The first step is operator-by-value interpretation. The
epistemic operators resulting from classifying modality operators were attributed with the corresponding levels
of confidence (possibility, probability, or necessity). For this purpose, the principle of epistemic validity was
adopted, i.e., the epistemic status applies to a phenomenon at the present time. This principle, for example, treated
would as valid for the expression of a phenomenon at the present time and assigned probability to this operator.
This principle also treated would as valid for the expression of a phenomenon at the past when, by the tense
sequence rule, it was used for a phenomenon at the past; certainty, therefore, was attributed to this operator. This
principle requires that epistemicity of a past event be presented with an epistemic operator followed by have
(operator of a past event) and the past participle.
The subsequent step was the interaction-oriented interpretation to suggest how an epistemic claim may
have been used to reveal some awareness of the supposed writer-reader interaction. Certain features in the three
levels of epistemic confidence were taken as interactionally motivated.
The second step was epistemic-by-evidential analysis to relate different types of evidentiality to the three
epistemic levels of confidence. Different categories of evidentials (direct-observable; direct-unobservable;
indirect-observable; and indirect-unobservable) were found to be inter-related and this inter-relation led to an
epistemic level of confidence. Within these occurrential patterns of evidentiality and epistemic modality,
unobservability and absence of a causal design were sufficiently responsible for epistemic modality.
Instrument
The key instrument was the investigator provided with some knowledge of the relevant literature to help
him to be sensitive to the required data. The other instrument to be shared in the investigator triangulation was
Palmer’s (1987) framework of deontic, epistemic, and dynamic types of modality and Halliday’s (1985) operators
of epistemic modality.
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The modality operators were limited to Halliday’s (1985: 337) proposal of epistemic modality operators
may, might and could for the low value (possibility). The presence of epistemic modality was strengthened with
the periphrastic epistemic operators possible and seem.
Investigator triangulation was adopted for research credibility, a quality proposed in research (McMillan,
1992: 217; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). It involved a senior lecturer of syntax and semantics with a master’s degree
in linguistics two graduates with the doctor’s degree in English Language Education with the relevant interests.
Results
Epistemic possibility is the low value of epistemic modality that depends on the interpretation that is
enriched by some explicit immediate context, paraphrases, and some reasonable motivation. This part presents
the findings and discussion of some features in epistemic possibility.
1. Compatibility and Optionality
In the following examples, epistemic possibility is indicated by may.
1. Such introduction may not help to frame the problems for the English-speaking readers.
2. English-speaking readers may be confused with such an essay because the focus of discussion is not clear.
3. This may be due to the effect of formal education in the independence era, especially in the New Era.
The possible effect in (1) is reasoned out from an “irrelevant” introduction, and an unclear discussion
(“focus of discussion is not clear”) in (2). The cause of scarcity of critical thinking in (3) is speculated on the basis
of the characteristics of the New Era, such as “students memorize details than think of them”. An epistemic
statement like (1) can be paraphrased by “It is possible that this irrelevant introduction does not help to frame the
problems for the English-speaking readers”. Epistemic possibility with the same operator can be authority-based.
4. Since formulation of title describes the selection of a topic (cf. Taft et al., 1962; Reid, 1988; Reid, 1992), it
may describe the thought of the writer on the topic.
5. Oxford (1989) and Oxford and Ehrman (1995) suggest that the Asian culture promotes rote memorization
and study of language rules. This may explain why such memory-related strategies were quite popular among
most of the learners in this study.
They reveal that epistemic possibility applies to causal reasoning that relates direct evidentials (the
findings) to personally unobservable phenomena provided by personal background knowledge (1, 2) or an
authoritative assumption (5), or an observable phenomenon (experience) in (3). There is semantic compatibility,
first, between the finding and the unobservable phenomena in (1, 2); second, between the finding and personal
experience in (3). In (4), no finding is yet mentioned and causal reasoning relates two unobservable phenomena
as authorized possibly to guide data commentaries.  In (5), the epistemic possibility operator might qualify
“explain” to introduce a causal relation and “the Asian culture” is assumed without any account how certain Asian
cultural traits possibly relates to the finding.
Epistemic possibility can be made tentative by modal operators might and could, to show psychological
distancing.
6. Such introduction might not help to frame the problems for the English-speaking readers.
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7. This problem might have been caused by the position of the second ‘who’, which is far away from the noun
as antecedent, ‘the beginner’.
8. This could be a sign of ignorance or that the reader wanted to get the meaning of unknown word as fast as
possible.
These (might and could) are the tentative forms of epistemic may … to express a lower degree of
possibility” (Palmer, 1988: 119). They produce “a psychological distancing effect” (Brown, 1991, 124). Such an
effect may be found in a main verb through grammaticalizing time relations, e.g., the past tense to refer events
prior to events at present. This is interestingly found with the same proposition (1, 6), where variety might be
more reasonably suggested rather psychological distancing.  There is accumulation of psychological (might) and
temporal distancing (have) in (7), which is found within the same source. In (7) there is the past marker have and
it can be paraphrased by ‘It is tentatively possible that this problem was caused by the position of the second
‘who’, which is far from the noun as antecedent, ‘the beginner’. Examples (7, 8) enrich the patterns of epistemic
possibility: between two observable phenomena in (7), and between a finding an unobservable phenomenon in
(8). Again, the investigator’s background knowledge plays its role in assigning compatibility to a causal relation;
between a finding (mistranslation of “who” by “siapa”) and another finding (distant “who”), although this distant
“who” doesn’t seem to warrant the possible causal relation; and between the finding of “this” (the first meaning
among other meanings in the dictionary) and an unobservable event “as fast as possible” in (8).
There are non-auxiliary operators of epistemic modality and they are worth exploring for enrichment to
the patterns of evidentiality and epistemic modality. One of them is possible.
9. The possible explanation of the problems identified when guessing strategies were conducted was that there
were limited contextual clues surrounding the problematic lexical items.
10. This recurring pattern among EFL learners can be accounted for by at least two possible explanations.
11. One possible factor is culture.
In (9) possible modifies explanation, which can be paraphrased by ‘It is possible that the limited
contextual clues explain the problems’, where explain is a causal relation operator between a finding of “the
problems” (i.e., mistranslations) and “limited contextual clues”.  With no account available for identifying the
limited clues, “limited contextual clues” is unidentified or unobservable or not found. In (10) possible is epistemic
in the following ways: first, it questions the presence of certain Asian cultural traits, although the subjects are
assumed by region (Indonesia) to share the Asian culture; second, if present, whether they cause the finding of
the recurrent  The quantitative approximator “at least” takes the number as tentative. There seems some obscurity
in the co-occurrence of “can be accounted” and “possible explanations”. As far as an account is an explanation
for the same causal relation, it could be that, first, can is synonymized with possible to share the epistemic value,
regardless of the neutral-epistemic typology for the sake of variety of modality operators in such a reasonable
context as one sentence, or, second, synonymized to share the same neutral (non-epistemic) possibility; or, third,
distinguished for different purposed. This obscurity results from Palmer’s (1988: 113) arbitrary assignment of
neutral possibility to can and epistemic possibility to can’t and could. There is no syntactic problem in
paraphrasing can for neutral possibility in “It is possible for the recurring pattern among EFL learners to be
accounted for by at least two possible explanations”. This paraphrase seems more acceptable than “It is possible
that the recurring pattern is accounted …” and takes the third option.  A possible interpretation is, therefore, that
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neutral possibility applies to the activity of “accounted for” and epistemic possibility to the result of that activity
(“explanation”).  This would be like this that it is possible to account a finding, but whether the account is possible
is a different problem. This process-product distinction is adopted in this specific example where the process
seems synonymous with the product, or where the process introduces the product in causal reasoning. The product
(“possible explanations”) in (10) is consistently repeated in “possible factor” in (11), which can be paraphrased
by “It is possible that culture is a factor for rote memorization” (Examples 5, 10, and 11 are contextually related).
2. Deontic-Epistemic Co-existence
The analysis of non-auxiliary epistemic operators reveals epistemic harmony, e.g., quite-possibly,
perhaps-possible, perhaps-would, and cross-typological can-perhaps. In (54), there is the harmony of “perhaps”
and “possible”, confusion between factivity and non-factivity, and distancing.
12. Thus, they only learned the formal structure necessary for writing ….  Formal learning, however, according
to Krashen’s monitor theory, has a limited function in language production. This condition made the students
produce a piece of writing with insufficient linguistic knowledge to write with….This is perhaps a possible
answer to the question why a four semester learning time seemed to have a little effect on moving the students
to a better writing achievement.
There is epistemic possibility when perhaps is paraphrased by ‘It is possible that the theory is a possible
answer’. In this example, “it” refers to the finding of “formal learning” as indicated by the form-oriented course
outlines and the instructors’ adherence to the course outlines and as confirmed in “Thus, they only learned the
formal structure necessary for writing”; “it” also refers to the theoretical model to explain the finding of “seemed
to have a little effect” in a causal relation. There is also epistemic possibility when “a possible answer” is
paraphrased by “It is possible that it answers the question”. In this concord, the same possibility operators of the
same epistemic value “reinforce each other” (Halliday, 1976: 194). The operator seemed is existential to refer to
the finding that “Yet, the progress was so little that in general it could not only be proved by statistical evidence
after three semesters”. This is an instance of epistemic possibility generated from the temporal sequence of “formal
learning” and “a little effect” and “formal learning” that is guided by the theoretical model. Surprisingly, the
epistemic causal relation is preceded by the categorical causal relation (“made the students produce”). There
variety between factivity (“made”) and non-factivity (mutually reinforcing “perhaps” and “possible”).  Instead of
breaking the principle of innocence by accusing variety of inconsistency or incongruence, one may probe different
purposes, i.e., the writing and the truth of the causal relation. The categorical (unmodalized) relation is her
personal responsibility in such a case as the temporal sequence of two events (findings) of the same subjects with
such indication of form-oriented course outlines and confirmation as one given by such responsible witnesses as
colleagues and such a widely accepted theory as SLA proposed by such an accredited authority as Krashen. She
wouldn’t, however, impose her responsibility upon the readers. There is probably neither variety nor
inconsistency. She would assume her responsibility as an individual investigator without neglecting the readers’
conclusion about the findings as presented. The findings are presented convincingly, the investigator has made
the conclusion, and the readers are interactionally invited to have their own. This would be a good example that
allows one to distinguish the deontic (normative) power of the scientific community and the epistemological
power of the evidentials in the expression of a causal relation. The causal relation is reasonably factive in that
particular context although unsympathetic with the Humean causation principle of constant regularity; it is also
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reasonably epistemic for allowing different conclusions and politeness. Skepticism doesn’t seem to be always
associated with epistemic modality.
3. Indicative-Epistemic Distinction
An exploration of non-auxiliary operators of epistemic possibility clarifies the existential-epistemic
distinction. For example, existential seem, as found in (12), is getting clear in the following contrast between
existential seem in (13) and epistemic seem (15, 16). It also reveals that “suggest” is existentially indicative
(presenting the finding) and less strong that other indicative verbs such as “indicate” and “show”.
13. Experiences in writing articles that they gain from school writing assignments and from outside school--
journals, seminars, research and the like--seem to be influential than learning the conventions of English
essays with lack of exercises in writing essays.
14. This suggests that experiences in writing (academic) essays affect them to write academic essays in English.
15. By using ‘hal ini’, ‘hal itu’, ‘hal tersebut’, or even ‘kebenaran ini’ or ‘pendapat ini’ in the translation, the
subjects would seem to know that ‘this’ refers to the truth about an object falling down from a high  place.
16. Social status seems to be another logical cause for the diversity of strategies.
There are two pairs of findings in (13):  first, “Responses to the questionnaires show that those who write
academic essays according to the convention of English rhetoric are the ones who are experienced in writing
academic essays”; second, “on the other hands students who developed their ideas in indirect way are the ones
who lack of experiences in writing (academic) essays”. Since all the students have learnt the convention (as also
confirmed by the interview), the emerging factor is conclusively “experience” and seem is existential and can be
replaced by is. This factor recurs in (14), where a causal relation is introduced by “suggests” and “affect”.
Examples (13, 14) illustrate how factivity (“affect”) is prompted in a mild way (“seem” and “suggests”) and how
the power of the deontic norm (politeness) may be distinguished from the power of the evidential (the finding) in
the same way in (12). The interview to explore this congruence might have been grounded on this preconceived
answer and the assumption of other factors ceteris paribus. By contrast, in (15), without would, seem would ease
epistemic reading because there has been no strategy to distinguish between the subjects who know and who do
not know when both of them have the same translation. It is a good case where two epistemic senses are
“cumulative in meaning” (Halliday, 1976: 194). Example (16) mentions an unobservable phenomenon (“social
status” for “money”) questions whether “the facilities” that money can buy really account for the diversity of
learning strategies, as warranted in “Having enough money, learners who came from high social status could gain
more access to facilities which enhanced their English proficiency: TV sets, tape recorders, cassettes, supplementary
books, computers, and even additional English courses from private tutors”. There is no evidential about the socio-
economic classification and the facilities of a certain socio-economic group of students. With no authority
involved, this is a genuine personal interpretation of a causal relation where relevance is offered by the semantic
field of the finding (“diversity of strategies”, “facilities”, “money”, “social status”), making a point in the
economic view of learning. It might also be inspired by some personal experience or observation of a similar
phenomenon.
The existential-epistemic distinction may not readily lead to interactional respect and might impress
triviality. In the following examples, this impression is found.
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17. Again, since there may be no auxiliaries in Bahasa Indonesia, compared to that encountered by English
acquiring children, the task that Indonesian acquiring children have to do is very simple.
18. Mika’s negative construction development is definitely simpler than that of English acquiring children since,
as has been mentioned previously, there seem to be no auxiliary verbs in Bahasa Indonesia.
19. This is understandable since in Bahasa Indonesia there are no auxiliary verbs to which negative markers
should be attached.
There are two judgments. Epistemic judgment is articulated by “there may be no” in (17), “seem to be
no” in (18), and existential (factive-categorical) judgment by “there are no” in (19). In these examples, there two
types of power: epistemic-personal grammar and factive-Indonesian grammar. Example (63) comments the
finding of the intra-sentential negative markers “nggak, belum, jangan, and bukan” in child language acquisition
of Bahasa Indonesia,  the formal treatment of the finding “mau” and “boleh” as “simple predicates”, and the
personal viewpoint ( “regarded to behave like English modal auxiliaries”). This indecisiveness is the source of the
epistemic possibility in may, which “lies between yes and no” (Halliday, 1986: 335). The indecisive existence of
“auxiliaries” recurs in the indecisive existence of “auxiliary verbs” introduced by seem in (64) due to the indecisive
classification of the findings as. Surprisingly, the formal treatment is further made explicit in (65), where
“understandable” comments a syntactically uncomplicated process in acquisition of negative markers and is
followed by a reason. This reason is a language rule, which is expressed by “should”. A theory may postulate its
proper methods categorically, and these methods may be seen as obligatory by upon its followers, but it is
questionable whether a theory (Indonesian grammar) lays an obligation upon itself. For this reason should is
complementary to are. In these examples, there is a judgment route: indecisive “seem” and “may” to decisive “are
no” in the light of Indonesian grammar. It is possibly unreasonable to assign politeness or indirection to (67, 68);
the power of the references is clear formal category and personal viewpoint). The causal relation is a different
problem. The attribution of the finding (“simple” acquisition) to Indonesian grammar is worth commenting, i.e.,
the causal relation is factive although the effect (child acquisition ease) doesn’t seem to follow the cause (formal
ease). An assumption of exemplary grammar by adults, if any, would sound trivial in natural settings. The first
point possibly intends to express some indirection, i.e., possibility for factuality, and the second point may
pragmatically imply that those simple predicates are classifiable as auxiliaries. In this case, the investigator might
intend to leave his epistemic-personal interpretation for the standard grammar. In contrast to epistemic-
interactional perhaps-possible in (12) and existential-interactional seem in (13) and interactional-falsified seem in
(20 – 23), the investigator might want to express his respect to the public by his decision in adopting the standard
grammar where “there are no auxiliaries”.
4. Falsified-Epistemic
Seuren (1985: 390 – 402) argues that “In fact, modal statements are not true or false per se, as Quine has
it, but contingently …. it is inappropriate or unacceptable … to make a modal statement about something which
is already known to be true”. This is not obeyed in the following example where seem is immediately falsified or
disclaimed.
20. In terms of syntax errors, however, it seemed that they did not develop their ability in constructing structurally
correct sentences.
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Example (20) comments the finding that “the number of syntax errors increased as course level
increased”, but this comment is denied in that “the students showed their syntax development” and “it was obvious
that the number of complex sentences increased as course level increased”. The denial results from the switch of
viewpoint, i.e., syntax development is determined by the number of complex sentences and not from syntax errors.
This kind of judgment revision is reinforced by a concessive sense in the following examples.
21. Thus, although the finding by Huda (1997) seems to contradict the finding of this present study, the
explanations offered for the two phenomena basically stand on the same ground, namely that the better
learners are more automatic in executing language processing, more aware of their potentials, and thus more
efficient and systematic in their selection of strategies.
22. While at a glance this seems to be superiority, a further scrutiny will make it clear that this actually represents
a barrier for the beginners.
23. Even a clause which seemed easy to understand might have turned out to be a real problem.
This revision strategy results in pairs of counterparts: although contradict vs. basically the same ground
in (21), while superiority vs. actually a barrier in (68), and even easy vs. turned out a real problem in (23). In
(18), the authoritative finding is that “the better learners use fewer strategies than the poorer ones, as his study
indicated” and the current finding is that of the diversity of strategies among better learners. The contradiction between
“fewer” and “diversity” is settled in “the same ground … efficient”. Falsification works through a deeper analysis in
(228) and a finding in (69). In these cases, there are two steps of data commentaries where seem introduces a hasty or
first-sight judgment (prima facie possibility) to be followed by a factive-decisive judgment. There is de facto no
epistemic sense in seem and it can readily be substituted by a non-assertion for negative factivity. Epistemic
possibility introduces non-factivity that lies between negative factivity and positive factivity. This strategy would
be attributed to the interaction between the deontic-interactional power and the evidential power. It should be fair
to consider this interaction rather than conventionally assume the supremacy of the deontic power upon the
evidential power. The investigators assume their responsibility in their analyses in the form of the factive-decisive
judgments but they do not want to negate the prima facie judgments directly in case some readers might adopt
these hasty judgments. They would be polite with this indirect refusal. They might want to present the proper
judgments or put them upon first-sight judgments without suggesting how hasty some readers might be.
5. Operator-Sharing
Epistemic possibility shares some operators with other types of modality. As already exemplified, the
operator may is used for epistemic possibility. This operator is also used for existential possibility, which stems
from the available data and refers to the vague quantifier ‘some’ or the vague frequency marker ‘sometimes’.
24. Linguistically, the data show that the definite and indefinite controlling ideas may be hedged using verbal
and adverbial expressions or are unhedged.
25. The findings of this study show that students with very good English competence may not write academic
essays in English according to the convention of academic writing.
Existential possibility is made explicit by “the data show” followed by examples of hedged and unhedged
controlling ideas in (24), and “The findings of this study show” with no explicit occurrence of unsatisfactory
essays by students with very good competence in English in (25). A paraphrase may read “Some definite and
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indefinite controlling ideas are hedged using verbal and adverbial expressions or are unhedged” for (24). It may
also read “Students with very good competence sometimes do not write academic essays in English according to
the convention of academic writing” for (25). A variety of existential possibility is tentative existential possibility
operated by might in two sub-varieties.
26. In his attempt to grasp the meaning of an unfamiliar word, he might misuse the correct strategy or use the
wrong strategy.
27. They might have mispronounced or misspelled the problematic words.
The domain or the evidential for (26) and (27) is the available data in text reading that include “using a
dictionary” and “took ′pat′ as ′pet”, mistranslation of “pet” by “memelihara”, “false cognates” and use of
mistaken background or general knowledge in “Brooklyn” for “nama orang”. The event is given in the past
marked by have. A domain-based paraphrase would read “He sometimes misuses the correct strategy or uses the
wrong strategy” for (26), and “They sometimes mispronounced or misspelled the problematic words” for (27).
There two temporal sub-varieties.
Another marker for existential possibility is the epistemic-sounding operator possibility that in the
following example.
28. The proportion difference might also be related to the possibility that as children become more advanced
linguistically they would converge more and more to the adult language use.
There are three operators, “might” and “the possibility that”, and “would” in the comment on the finding
of an overextension of “idiosyncratic meanings” (12.24% by an older subject and 22.63% by the younger). It is
followed by an authoritative belief in “Griffiths (1986), for example, believes that “... overextension... usually
ceases as soon as the child’s production repertoire includes what adults would deem to be a more appropriate
word.” The first operator (“might”) is epistemic when “related” is intended for a causal relation and the possible
cause is the age difference. This co-occurrence of the proportion difference and the age difference is commented
under the influence of the authoritative belief. This authoritative belief is lowered to epistemic possibility
expressed by the second operator “the possibility that”.  The third operator (“would”) is epistemic as dictated, and
permitted, by the second operator; it also adds some tentativeness to the second operator.
In the following example, however, “the possibility that” conveys existential possibility.
29. Besides the possibility that a certain lexical item was not found in the dictionary, the reader might select the
wrong entry, the wrong meaning, or even an example as the description of the problematic lexical item.
In (29) both “the possibility that” and “might” are used for existential possibility because an immediate
example is given, i.e., the problematic word “invariant”, which was not found in the dictionary at the time of data
analysis and misunderstanding is exemplified throughout the analysis. This possibility may be explicitly
commented, as found in (30) below.
30. The possibility that what had happened at a lower level could have some effect on what happened at a higher
level, or vice versa, should not be denied.
It is expressed by “the possibility that’ and “could” for a past time event and right away indicated by the
immediate deontic warning in “should not be denied” (By the tense sequence rule, “could” is a past tense form).
This is also supported by the relevant data, e.g., the mistranslation of “who” by “siapa”, ”that” by “itu”, “a dash”
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by “sehingga”, and the absence of the translation of “under which” that result in sentence miscomprehension; that
is to say that analyzing sentence comprehension inevitably analyzing lexical problems. This possibility is also
expressed by can in the following examples.
31. Lexical items such as ‘rationale’, ‘consequent’, ‘duplicate’, ‘complication’, and ‘introduction’ can cause
problem because they are false cognates with rasional (rational), konsekuen (being responsible), duplikat
(spare as in spare key), komplikasi (said of an illness or a problem made worse because of another illness or
problem), and introduksi (getting to know something or somebody), respectively.
32. Background knowledge can help a reader understand a text but this is not always the case. Holmes and
Ramos (1995) demonstrated that even plentiful background knowledge about the content addressed in a text
was not always a good thing, particularly when background knowledge contradicted textual information.
A few data are given to exemplify existential possibility in (31):  ‘rationale’, ‘consequent’, ‘duplicate’,
‘complication’, and ‘introduction’ and the false cognates. A similar paraphrase with “some” or sometimes” apply
to (31), as also illustrated previously for existential possibility, e.g., “Some false cognates cause problems” (What
is intended is possibly that some false cognates are problems). In (32), conceptual or neutral possibility is imposed
by “this is not always the case” that is grounded on the authoritative finding as explicitly introduced by
“demonstrated” and “was not always a good thing”.
The operator can may, however, be used for neutral possibility that predicates the possibility to the
subject of the statement. It says “that something is possible without suggesting that this depends on anyone’s
ability” and “circumstantial in that the circumstances make it possible” (Palmer, 1988: 112-113). The following
examples exercise can for neutral possibility.
33. Then the question why the two different analyses revealed different results can be explained in respect to the
variance of the groups.
34. At the most, they employed only four kinds of strategies that can be regarded as metacognitive strategies,
namely correcting dialogues, studying grammar, understanding dialogues (before memorizing them), and
immersing oneself into an English-speaking community.
35. Whether the topic is concrete of which it is often more successful or abstract of which it is difficult to support
can be understood from the formulation of the title.
Example (33) can be paraphrased by “It is possible for the different results to be explained by the variance
of the groups”. By means of voice neutrality, it can be paraphrased by “The variance of the groups can explain
the different results”. These two paraphrases suggest no one’s ability. They suggest a circumstance in which the
possibility is found, i.e., statistical operations. This example can be circumstantially paraphrased by “It is
statistically possible for the different results to be explained by the variance of the groups”. A similar strategy can
be adopted to paraphrase the other examples. This strategy confirms the neutral possibility, as practiced above,
and helps in specifying that possibility in its relevant conceptual domain. It is explainability in statistics for (33),
classifiability in learning styles for (34), and understandability in academic writing (35). As already found in
epistemic possibility, there is also tentativeness in neutral possibility to reveal some psychological distancing
effect in neutral possibility.
36. Why the ANOVA yielded different results could be explained in part by the nature of the analysis (M, 114).
Magister Scientiae – ISSN 2622-7959 127
Edisi No. 48 Oktober 2020
Example (36) can be paraphrased by “It is tentatively possible for the different results to be explained in
part by the nature of the analysis” or “The nature of the analysis in part can tentatively explain the different results”
to reveal tentativeness and its independence of one’s ability. There is tentative explainability in statistics in (82).
Neutral possibility is also found in the following examples: “can be illustrated in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b.”; “can be
classified”, “can be compared with the same subject’s written interpretation, which read as follows”, “can be
summarized as follows”, “can be concluded that”. It may involve sensation-related verbs, e.g., “can be seen in
Table 4.13.”; “can be seen that the subject did not translate ‘pat’, “can be seen in line 1”, “can be observed from
the following data”, “we can observe that the subject had separated the adjective clause from the nouns it
modifies”, “can be read from her written work, which is as follows”, “can be found in the Appendix”. Neutral
possibility runs into a merger with actuality, i.e., explanation given, categories mentioned, title formulation
analyzed and exemplified, and sensation experienced. This actuality implies a little sense of practical ability or
success.
Examples with could be may be classified into three. First, there are examples of neutral possibility that
involve contingency (as exemplified in 82), e.g., “could only be obtained through a close examination of Appendix
3”; “could reasonably be appreciated”; “could be drawn clearly” and “it could be the case that” with no tense
marker. They are different from “could be recorded from the very start for the observation started when he was
1;6” that mentions a past tense adverbial where could is not the tentative form of can; it is the past tense form of
can. Second, other examples with could be seem to combine neutral possibility and epistemic possibility, e.g.,
“could be regarded as”; “could be perceived to be”; “could be viewed to contain”; “could be forwarded to account
for”; “could be categorized long with”; “could be accountable by means of”. They are different from the third
group, e.g., “could be perceived that there is” and “could be witnessed” (with no tense adverbial) to indicate the
existence of the relevant data with some implication of personal success. The passive operator could be may serve
three purposes: neutral-tentative possibility, neutral-epistemic possibility (a case of indeterminacy), and
existential possibility. In data commentaries, the first and second describe the third, i.e., they are concerned with
appropriateness of the description of the data obtained in the existential possibility. They are not concerned with
causality, which is mostly exercised in epistemic possibility with other operators. This interpretation is based on
neutral possibility, particularly in the passive, which predicates “the possibility to the subject of the sentence” and
where “can, never may”, is used “without suggesting that this depends on anyone’s ability” (Palmer, 1988: 112).
Epistemic examples of “might be explained”, “it could be that” and “it might be that” are, however, found to
raise a theoretical problem about indeterminacy in the modality status of could, whether the tentative form of
neutral can or epistemic may. Another theoretical question is whether might might possibly be neutral, and
whether can might be epistemic and, therefore, dynamic-neutral possibility might be epistemic possibility.
There are few points to be discussed. A relevant point in epistemic possibility is that it seems to dominate
data commentaries. This might be true in light of operator sharing where the operators that are prototypically
epistemic (may, might, could) are borrowed for existential possibility, which can, otherwise, be expressed with no
modality markers. Vague quantifiers and frequency operators, as also found, can replace existential possibility
operators. Neutral possibility, which can be properly expressed by can is also operated by could to result in
neutral-epistemic indeterminacy.  Epistemic possibility harmony of two equivalent values may also confirm this
dominance as this harmony may stem from some personal drive for the reinforcement in epistemic possibility.
Epistemic possibility is, however, distinguished from existential possibility and neutral possibility.
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Indeterminacy, operating through can, could, and might in the passive, serves the purpose of the possibly
proper description of the relevant data. It involves neutral possibility, e.g., explainabability in statistical analysis,
concludability and summarizability after some discussion through the operator “could”. Neutral possibility
suggests no one’s ability and no obstacles in giving the explanation, and existential possibility is evidentialized
through the presence of the explanation, the conclusion, and the summary. Neutral possibility though giving the
explanation (that must have been through some revision and confirmation) may be paraphrased this way: “It is
possible to give some explanation after a quantitative finding, conclusion and summary after some lengthy
discussion”. The data of might be and it might be that may shed this epistemic possibility upon the validity of the
explanation or description expressed in could be and can be. There might be, therefore, a claim for some degree
of epistemic possibility in the sense that minimally the writer does not know that the explanation is false because
the source text must have been sufficiently reviewed and revised, properly examined to be the final draft, or in the
sense that there might be further revision because the explanation may be less proper than expected. This epistemic
status seems to have been too far as assigned to neutral explainability in statistics, where the explanation is a
statistical operation:  “can be explained in respect to the variance of the groups”, and “could be explained in part
by the nature of the analysis”. This particular case of could exemplifies a very high skeptical attitude, whether
considered or not by the writer. This might have been motivated by a strong search for variability in modality
operators or a desire to be epistemic in data commentaries. Should the writer be found to clarify the position, this
indeterminacy might remain, i.e., he might let the readers select one of the reasonable interpretation by themselves
and indeterminacy might be a strategy. This strategy is possibly comparable to vagueness strategy in data
presentation through vague quantifiers such as “most”, “more”, and “less”, and “might” in existential possibility.
An indeterminacy strategy allows reasonable interpretations and, because found in data description, it might be
related to some personal commitment to a certain body of knowledge for data analysis, as suggested in this view
in language acquisition, where neutral-epistemic indeterminacy is frequently found: “there is no one theory of
language comprehensive enough … there are differing and sometimes contradicting theories”. A vagueness
strategy usually provides no exact quantifier and might be possibly be geared by some search for a common
pattern in data analysis. Quite possibly, a vagueness strategy is related to the nature of the sources of those
vagueness operators. They are qualitative research reports, which “rarely include tables with numbers” and where
“any numerical information is supplementary to the textual “because the purpose is to make the data
“understandable” (Neuman, 1997: 334-335). They both reflect position indecisiveness and might be influenced
by experience in reading where indeterminacy and vagueness operators are usually found.
Another relevant point in epistemic possibility is subjectivity. Epistemic possibility may be referred to
as neutral with respect to subjectivity because it is usually found in the impersonal style, i.e., thematizing research
findings to behave as the source of the epistemic judgments instead of presenting the first person pronoun as the
grammatical subject. It is, however, conceivably subjective in the sense that the writer is likely to be the source
of the judgments. Non-auxiliary operators such as “argues” and “suspected” may represent the writer’s assertive
acts and the selection of “might” and “may” for the same proposition, possibly reflect the writer’s psychological
different degrees of detachment or motivation for variety in possibility operators, but not the power of the relevant
evidential. Subjectivity may also be exercised in these units: “the writer of this study often finds”, “the investigator
recognizes”, “the investigator argues”, “this study argues”, “the writer’s intention”, and very explicitly in “Since
rich interpretation approach is adopted in the present study, his utterances were interpreted based on the
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researcher’s understanding”. Furthermore, it might be possible to introduce “I/the investigator thinks that” to
replace possibility operators. A peripheral reason may be the selection of certain verbs such as “espoused” and
“states” for authoritative names in data commentaries to suggest credibility as well as responsibility. The explicit
neutrality (or impersonal style) in epistemic possibility might, therefore, serve as a device to obscure subjectivity
in the sense of the writer’s certain amount of knowledge.
Causality is also a relevant point for discussion in relation to a certainty degree. It is generally expressed
in epistemic possibility when it refers to a preceding and concurrent enabling factor. Rivière (1981: 187) argues
that an inference is “stronger” when “the inferred event takes place in the past or the present” than the one when
“the inferred event takes place in the future”. This claim might be based on some limited observation excluding
academic or scientific writing or guided by an assumption of the psychological closeness of the present past events
to the person who makes the judgment. The finding disconfirms his claim. The assignment of epistemic possibility
to causality is found in scientific writing where skepticism is highly appreciated and epistemic possibility serves
an excellent device for expressing skepticism. Epistemic possibility is concerned with optionality; it is found with
one option as well as a number of options.
Epistemic possibility is assumed to be reflection of politeness. Harjanto (1999: 212) holds this
assumption and relates epistemic modality to experiences in writing. It develops from the assumption that science
is “built on pragma and on docere (instructing, informing) but also on delectare (entertaining) and movere
(moving, enchanting)” (Markkanen and Schroder, 2000: 6). The interactional pathos-oriented interpretation is
convincingly demonstrated by the co-existence of epistemic modality operators and deontic requests in Carretero
(2000) and Fraser (1975). This interpretation may be applicable here to the co-existence of two separate epistemic
modality operators and the co-existence of modalization and unmodalization. When a deontic request is absent,
that interpretation may remain as an interpretation, as argued by Salager-Meyer (1997: 108) that “it is difficult to
be sure … nor need we assume that the authors of hedged utterances always know why they hedge their
statements”.
Summary
Throughout the analysis, two patterns of evidentiality and epistemic possibility are found in causal
relations, first, direct-direct relation, and second indirect-direct relation. The direct-direct relation applies to two
sub-relations: between personally observable phenomenon and personally unobservable phenomenon. The
indirect-direct relation also applies to two sub-relations: between an authoritatively assumed (unobservable)
phenomenon and a personally observable phenomenon, and second, between an authoritatively observable
phenomenon and a personally observable phenomenon. These four sub-relations are thus: first, directly
observable-and-directly observable; second, directly unobservable-and-directly observable; third, indirectly
unobservable-and-directly observable; and four, indirectly observable-and-directly observable. A directly
observable phenomenon results from data analyses and is reported in a categorical statement or in existential
possibility. A directly unobservable phenomenon results from some search for a compatible phenomenon outside
data analyses. An indirectly observable phenomenon is found in an authoritative research report. An indirectly
unobservable phenomenon is an authoritative assumption or opinion. These patterns suggest that a causal
reasoning always involve a directly observable phenomenon.
130 Magister Scientiae – ISSN 2622-7959
Edisi No. 48 Oktober 2020
Epistemic possibility operates with may, might, could, possible, the possibility that, suggest, and seem.
There may be an operator interaction, e.g., the simultaneous presence of the two operators of the same possibility
value perhaps-might that results in mutual strengthening. The presence of the two operators may and might for
the same proposition of the two statements may suggest the interchangeability. Some of these operators also
belong to other types of possibility, i.e., may, might, the possibility that and could to existential possibility; and,
could to neutral-tentative possibility. One of these operators, i.e., seem, inappropriately behaves as epistemic-but-
false in non-causal data description; it is immediately denied. The presence and absence of a modality operator
for the expression of the same intention, and the co-existence of two separate modality operators facilitates the
interpretation of epistemic modality in terms of politeness.
Epistemic and neutral possibilities characterize skepticism, expressing the commitment to, and
detachment from, the validity of the relevant propositions. Some space may be found between them, i.e., neutral-
epistemic indeterminacy, which seems particularly useful for the description of the data. With a sense of some
presumed relevance, epistemic possibility turns to be very easily obtainable for falsifiable or confirmable causal
relations.
References
Budiharso, T. 2001. Rhetoric and the Linguistic Featurres of English and Indonesian Essays by EFL
Undergraduate Students. Unpublished Dissertation. Universitas Negeri Malang.
Butler, C. S. 1988. Politeness and the Semantics of Modalized Directives in English. In Benson, J. D et al. (Eds.).
Linguistics in Systemic Perspective. Amsterdam: John Benjamin Publishing Company.
Carretero, M. The Role of Epistemic Modality in English Politeness Strategies. Universidad Complutense.
(Online).
Celce-Murcia, M and D. Larsen-Freeman. 1983. The Grammar Book. Massachusetts: Newburry House
Publishers, Inc.
Djiwandono, P. I. 1998. The Relationship between EFL Learning Strategies, Degree of Extroversion, and Oral
Communication Proficiency: A Study of Second-Year Secretarial Students at Widya Karya University.
Unpublished Dissertation. IKIP Malang.
Foley, W. A and R. D. van Valin Jr. 1985. Functional Syntax and Universal Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Fraser, B. 1975. Hedged Performatives. In P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (Eds.). Syntax and Semantics (III). New
York: Academic Press, Inc.
Gage, J. T. 1991. A General Theory of Enthymeme for Advanced Composition. In  K. H. Adams and J. L. Adams
(Eds.).
Givon, T. 1993. English Grammar. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Halliday, M. A. K. 1985. An Introduction to Functional Grammar. London: Edward Arnold.
Harjanto, I. 1999. English Academic Writing Features by Indonesian Learners of English. Unpublished
Dissertation. IKIP Malang.
Magister Scientiae – ISSN 2622-7959 131
Edisi No. 48 Oktober 2020
Holmes, J. 1982. Expressing Doubt and Certainty in English. RELC JOURNAL XII (2): 9-25.
Huddlestone, R. 1988. Introduction to the Grammar of English. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hyland, K. 1996. Scientific English: Hedging in a Foreign Culture, in James, J. E. (Ed.). The Language-Culture
Connection. Singapore: SEAMEO RELC.
Lee, D. A. 1992. Competing Discourses: Perspective and Ideology in Language. London: Longman.
Lyons, J. 1977. Semantics (Vol. II). Cambridge University Press.
Markkanen, R and H. Schroder. 2000. Hedging: A Challenge for Pragmatics and Discourse Analysis. (Online).
McMillan, J. H. 1992. Educational Research. New York: Harper Collins Publishers.
Meier, A. J. 1995. Defining Politeness: Universality in Appropriateness. Language Sciences, 17 (4): 345-356.
Mukminatien, N. 1997. The Differences of Students’ Writing Achievements across Different Course Levels.
Unpublished Dissertation. IKIP Malang.
Myers, G. 1989. The Pragmatics of Politeness in Scientific Articles. Applied Linguistics X (1): 1-35.
Ney, J. W. 1976. The Modals in English. Journal of English Linguistics (Volume X). Washington.
Palmer, F. R. 1987. Modality and the English Modals. London: Longman.
Palmer, F. R. 1998. Mood and Modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Quirk, R and  S. Greenbaum., G. Leech, J. Svartvik. 1985. A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language.
New York: Longman.
Raja, P. 2003. The Language of an Indonesian Child Named Mika in the Telegraphic and Simple Sentence Stages.
Unpublished Dissertation. Universitas Negeri Malang.
Regina. 2003. The Nature of Taboos in Dayak Kanayatn Community. Unpublished Dissertation. Universitas
Negeri Malang.
Salija, K. 2004. The Effects of Using Formal Outlines in Writing Exposition. Unpublished Dissertation.
Universitas Negeri Malang.
Simpson, P. 1993. Language, Ideology and Point of View. London: Routledge.
Strevens, P. 1987. Cultural Barriers to Language Lerarning. In Smith (Ed.). Discourse across Cultures (pp. 169-
178). New York: Prentice Hall.
Susilo. 2004. Thought Patterns as reflected in the Linguistic Features in Indonesian and English Letters Written
by Indonesians. Unpublished Dissertation. Universitas Negeri Malang.
Tuckman, B. W. 1975. Conducting Educational Research. Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers.
Wahyudi-Murdibjono, A. 2001. Problems and Strategies of Non-English Department Students in Understanding
sentences in Text Comprehension. Unpublished Dissertation. Universitas Negeri Malang.
